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ALIE N'S UNITED STATES RESIDENCE DETERMINES JURISDICTION UNDER
THE JONES ACT
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969)
Plaintiff Zacharias Rhoditis. a Greek seaman, was injured on board
a Greek flag-ship, the S.S. Hellenic Hero, in the Port of New Orleans,
Louisiana. Plaintiff signed on in Greece, his contract specifying that
Greek law should govern any actions arising thereunder. After filing a
libel in rem against the Hero under general admiralty jurisdiction,
plaintiff discovered that the ship was ultimately owned by Pericles
Callimanopolus, a Greek citizen and resident of New York for the past
twenty years. Oxnership was through Callimonopolus' control of a
Greek corporation whose Panamanian subsidiary owned the ship. The
ship bore Greek registry. The Greek Corporation is headed by
Callimanopolus. It operated in New York, where it had its principal
place of business. Pointing to Callimanopolus' United States domicile,
the lower court granted plaintiff's motion to convert the suit under
general admiralty jurisdiction to a complaint against the two shipping
lines' under the Jones Act.2 From an adverse verdict defendants appeal,
arguing that the lower court's finding of Jones Act jurisdiction was
improper. Held: affirmed: The United States domicile of a Greek
citizen who owns and operates a Greek corporation, whose principal
place of operation is the United States, and who is the ultimate owner
of a vessel registered in Greece, justifies application of the Jones Act
in a suit brought for an injury sustained on the vessel in a United States
port.
The Fifth Circuit began its reasoning by examining the Supreme
Court case of Lauritzen v. Larsen.' There the Court discussed the
relevant factors for consideration in determining the application of the
Jones Act. The most important of these factors were found to be the
I Rhodis v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 273 F Supp. 2.18 (S.D. Ala. 1967).
2 46 U S C. § 688 (1964). Under the Jones Act, the defendant may prove negligence and
estabhsh his. actual damages, or he may recover scheduled damages merely by showing
unsea'orlhincs Sec qeneralI Curric. The Sf/er Oar and .41 That: .4 Situdy of the Romero
(ase, 27 U Cm, L REX 1(1959).
3 Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
4 345 U S 571 (1953).
5 The Supreme Court outlined seven questions or points of contact which a court must.look
to in determining whether a Jones Act cause of action is stated in a case involving aliens. They
are the allegiance of the injured seaman, the allegiance of the ship owner; the law of the flag;
the place ol the tort: the place of the contract: the availability of a foreign forum: and the law
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place of the injury, the allegience of the shipowner and the law of the
flag.6 The "cardinal factor", the Supreme Court said, is the law of the
flag and, unless "some heavy counterweight appears," it must prevail.
The Fifth Circuit points out, however, that both the Supreme Court in
Lauritzen, and courts subsequently interpreting that decision, have been
willing to disregard the flag if it is merely a "flag of convenience." In
cases in which the flag is flown only to take advantage of the law of
the country in which the ship is registered, the courts have been willing
to look to the ultimate ownership of the vessel. The R'oditis court
states that these cases differ from the instant case only because in the
traditional flag of convenience cases the ship is ultimately owned by
citizens of the United States 7 while in the case before the court, the ship
is owned by an alien domiciliary. A resident alien, however, owes
temporary allegiance to the United States: if he commits a tort he may
be held liable for it; he may be required to serve in the United States
military. Because of the similarity of these obligations to those imposed
on United States citizens, the Fifth Circuit justified treating the resident
alien as if he were a citizen. By doing so it upholds jurisdiction under
the Jones Act by analogy to the flag of convenience cases.'
In Lauritzen the Supreme Court properly recognized that the
Jones Act could be construed to apply to all ocean going seamen. This
construction, however, would have been unreasonable, and the Court
adhered to the traditional doctrine that such acts should be construed
to apply "only to areas and transaction in which American law would
be considered operative under prevelent doctrines of international
law."' 1 In Lauritzen, as in the instant case, there was no question that
the federal government could apply the Jones Act if it so chose." The
question was, in light of comity and general international law, should
the intent of the legislature be construed as an attempt to apply United
States law with such an expansive extraterritorial effect?
of the forum. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 573 (1953). See generally 2 M. Nokkis, LAW
OF SEAMEN § 670 (Supp. 1959); Note, Admiralty and the Choice of Law: LAURITZEN V. LARSEN
Applied,47 VA. L. REV. 1400 (1961).
6. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 923 (5th Cir. 1969). For support for the cout's
conclusion, see Note, Admiralty and the Choice of Law: LAURITZEN V. LARSEN Applied, 47 VA.
L. REv. 1400, 1404 (1961).
7. 412 F.2d 919, 927-28 (5th Cir. 1969).
8. Id. at 926.
9. 345 U.S. 571, 576 (1953).
10. Id. at 577.
1I. Id. at 577-78.
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For reasons of comity and in accord with accepted principles of
international law, the Supreme Court in Lauritzen gave cardinal
importance of the law of the flag 2 and denied jurisdiction. But it is not
inconsistant with these principles of comity for a United States court,
in interpreting the Jones Act, to deny its own citizens the use of a flag
of convenience to circumvent the laws of the United States..3 The
Lauritzen court recognized this when, in discussing the flag of
convenience problem, it pointed out that "a state is not debarred by
any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own
citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights
of other nations or their nationals are not infringed."14
The Rhoditis court, however, did not consider the principles of
international law, nor the dictates of comity, in extending Jones Act
jurisdiction to alien domiciliaries. Temporary allegience conferred by
residency was equated with the permanent allegience giving a country
the right to control the actions of its citizens even when they have
passed beyond its borders.' 5 On the basis of this rather nubilous
equation the court avoids the main issues presented by the Rhoditis
suit.
First, the equation of temporary allegience to citizenship is an
inadequate basis for the Rhoditis holding." Secondly, a proper
12 Id at 585-86. See also Note, 4drniraltv and the Choice of Law: LAURTIZEN V. LARSEN
4pphed,47 VA. L REV 1400, 1405 (1961).
13 See generalyi Garis v. Compania Maritima San Basilio, 386 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967);
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc.. 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 359 U.S. 1000
(19591: Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 287 U.S. 642 (1932);
Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Bobolakis v.
Compama Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo. S.A., 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Zielinski v Empressa Honderena de Vapores, 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For a contrary
view under the Merchant Seamen's Act, ek, Lopes v. SS. Ocean Daphne, 377 F.2d 777 (4th Cir.
1964)
14 345 U S 571. 587 (1953). ting Skiroites v. Florida. 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1940) (emphasis
added).
15 Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1969). The court adopted
extensively the reasoning of Judge Waterman's dissent in Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers
Corp, 368 F.2d 426. 430 (2d Cir. 1966). cert denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967). As the Rhoditis
court points out, the facts in Tsakonites were identical to those in Rhoditis. Hellenic Lines Ltd.
v Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 925 (5th Cir. 1969).
16 Alternatively. it is possible to 'iew the opinion as holding that the long-time residency of
the defendants, 20 years, moves them from the area of temporary allegiance to the status of a
U S citizen for some purposes. There is substantial language to that effect in the Rhoditis
opinion, e g their discussion of the selective service liability of a resident alien. The alternative
does not save the case from its substantial difficulties. First, one may see that, had the defendants
returned to Greece belore the action was brought, their long residency would not have been asserted
RESIDENT ALIEN
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standard should be articulated for decisions in such cases-a standard
which embodies the principles of comity and international law the
Lauritzen case applies as guidelines in interpreting the Jones Act.
The United States citizen is subject to the laws of this country no
matter where he goes.17 He is also subject to the laws of the states in
which he may travel. He owes them a temporary allegience. But this
allegience is lost the moment he leaves their borders.' 8 Similarly, an
alien residing in this country owes obligation to the law of his
"temporary sovereign."'" He does not, by virtue of his temporary
residence, lose the obligation to comply with the laws of his own
country, insofar as that country chooses to regulate his activities. 9 It
is on the basis of the right of the sovereign to regulate its citizens
wherever they go that the Court in Lauritzen sanctions the flag of
convenience cases. 21 The temporary sovereignty which allows a country
in which an alien is resident to conscript him into its army or hold him
liable for his torts stops as soon as the alien ceases to be a resident."
It is a transient right based only on physical presence, and is the same
for a domiciliary who has lived in a foreign state for twenty years as
by the court to make them so like citizens as to be liable in Greece to a judgement, or to claim
jurisdiction over them. Although the United States could not get Greece. in an analogous case
involving an American citizen, to enforce the judgment, such judgment is valid against the
American citizen. From this it may be seen that, in that a Greek tourist would not be liable under
the Jones Act by virtue of the temporary allegiance he owes the United States during his tour,
there are quanta of temporary allegiance. In this alternative view, i.e.. not an equation of resident
alien to citizen but liability as that of an American citizen by virtue of a quantity of residence.
one sees that, no quantum is stated. Absent a legislative determination of the above-mentioned
quantum-presumably the courts could not define an exact period without assuming a legislative
function-the quantum will remain a relative one. A relative quantum residency test is workable
only on a case-by-case basis, and is therefore equally undesirable. were an exact quantum stated
in any case it would be easy to avoid liability by merely shifting residency periodically. Moreover.
case by case uncertainty as to jurisdiction under the Jones Act is contrary to the purpose of that
Act-establishment of a relatively certain, inexpensive and speedy recovery for maritime workers
similar to state workmen's compensation. See Comment, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 615 (1968): ci.
Calbeck v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 122-24 (1962).
17. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932): cl: MacDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90 (1917). See generally, Note, Operation of t.wrican Law Outside the Territorial United
States as Established by Judicial Declaration. 33 NoT. D. LAW. 98 (1957-58).
18. Tomoya Kawakita v. United States. 343 U.S. 717, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 850 (1952):
Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 wall.) 147, 154-55 (1872). Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F.
Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Cal. 1958), and cases cited therein. See also 3 G. HACKWORTII. DIGEST OI
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 253 at 328 (1942).
19. See note 17, supra.
20. See2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 137 (194i).
21. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587-88 (1953).
22. See note 17, supra.
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for a two week tourist. The allegiance of a domiciliary can not be
propery equated with that of the American citizen.
Principles of comity, then, would seem to militate against the
result in Rhoditis. A contract made by two Greek citizens, stipulating
that it should be interpreted by Greek law, and made in Greece, should
be interpreted by Greek law.23 Temporary sovereignty should make no
more difference for the foreign domiciliary than for the tourist.
The Rhoditis court does seem to attach some significance to the fact
that the corporation controlled by Callimanopolus had its principal
place of business in the United States.24 Should this factor be
considered as crucial and, combined with the domicile of the
corporation's major stockholder, be regarded as sufficient to make up
the "heavy counterweight" the Court in Lauritzen requires to offset the
presumption in favor of the application of the law of the flag?
The principal place of business has been utilized to determine
whether the corporation's veil should be pierced in order that the
ultimate owner, who was a United States citizen, could be looked to
in order for Jones Act jurisdiction to attach.25 As the precedent stands,
then, the only utility of the finding that the principal place of business
is in the United States is to facilitate a consideration of the citizen-
ship of the ultimate owner. Clearly, used in this way, the fact that the
principal place of business of Hellenic Lines is in the United States is
of no use to the plaintiff.
However, the court might have made another use of the "principal
place of business" in considering the advisability of applying the Jones
Act. The court could have left the citizenship of the owner
unquestioned, while instead holding that the ownership of the vessel by
a corporation having its principal place of business in New York
created a sort of quasi-citizenship for the purposes of the Jones Act,
23 1 G. H.cKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 18 (1940). See also The Over the
Top, 5 F 2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925).
24 Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 923 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969). The court looks to
the decision in Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
25 Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) and cases
cited therein For cases denying Jones Act jurisdiction when the ultimate owner is found to be a
resident alien, see Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966); Nakken
v Fearnley & Eger, 137 F. Supp. 288 (S D.N.Y. 1955) (Norwegian owners did their business in
New York city through a wholly-owned subsidiary known as Fearnley & Eger Inc.); Cruz v.
Harkna, unreported memorandeum No. 21103, Admiralty Docket No. 176-315, noted in Cruz
v Harkna, 122 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (The court held that it did not have jurisdiction
of the Jones Act claim where the ownership was by 23 Estonian refugee owners, many of whom
were residents of the United States, but who nevertheless were not citizens of the United States.)
RESIDENT ALIEN
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similar to the citizenship conferred by the federal rules on corporations
for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 2 If the corporation is really
a national corporation, but has acquired a corporate charter from a
foreign government in order to avoid United States maritime law, then
clearly the court would be justified in disregarding the sham,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss4/8
